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Abstract 
Preschool and school-age children’s memory and source monitoring were investigated by 
questioning them about one occurrence of a repeated lab event (n = 39). Each of the four 
occurrences had the same structure, but with varying alternatives for the specific activities and 
items presented. Variable details had a different alternative each time; hi/lo details presented the 
identical alternative three times and changed once.  New details were present in one occurrence 
only and thus had no alternatives.  Children more often confused variable, lo, and new details 
across occurrences than hi details. The 4- to 5-year-oldchildren were less accurate than 7- to 8-
year-old children at attributing details to the correct occurrence when specifically asked. 
Younger children rarely recalled new details spontaneously, whereas 50% of the older children 
did and were above chance at attributing them to their correct occurrence. Results are discussed 
with reference to script theory, fuzzy-trace theory and the source-monitoring framework. 
 
Research Article 
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In many cases of child sexual abuse, the victims’ memories and accounts of the alleged 
abuse are of primary importance in order for prosecution to proceed properly.  In recent years 
there has been increasing focus on understanding children’s memory representations of repeated 
events (e.g., Powell, Roberts, Thomson & Ceci, 2007; Price, Connolly & Gordon, 2006; Roberts 
& Powell, 2006). As many victims of child abuse often experience the abuse on multiple 
occasions (e.g., see Lamb, Sternberg, Esplin, Hershkowitz, Orbach & Hovav, 1997), it is 
especially relevant to characterize how these experiences are represented from both a practical 
and theoretical standpoint (see Roberts, 2002;  Roberts & Powell, 2001, for reviews).  
Many jurisdictions require that child witnesses are able to particularize; that is, to 
describe one instance with a reasonable degree of precision and to contextualize that instance 
with respect to time and place (Guadagno, Powell & Wright, 2006; R. v B. (G.), 1990; Roberts, 
2002; S v. R, 1989). Identifying and distinguishing a specific occurrence of a repeated event is an 
extremely daunting and difficult task for most children (Connolly & Lindsay, 2001; Hudson, 
1990; Powell, Roberts, Ceci & Hembrooke, 1999; Powell & Thomson, 1996).  
The purpose of this study was to examine whether pre-school and school-age children 
can notice and make use of distinctive information contained within a set of similar, repeated 
events to distinguish among them, and whether these abilities vary developmentally.  This is the 
first study to examine children’s memories of details (actions or objects) that are present in only 
one of four event occurrences and are thus not part of the general event script (‘new’ details1: for 
example, on the third day only, children do a warm-up activity).  This type of event detail is 
different from typical/atypical or episodic deviations present in previous research (e.g., Farrar & 
Boyer-Pennington, 1999; Farrar & Goodman, 1992). While prior experiments have included 
new/deviation details in a final target occurrence that were not previously presented in earlier 
‘standard’ visits, in the current research new details were present in any one of the repeated 
occurrences, not just at a final deviation visit. Other research has included some degree of 
variation in every occurrence (e.g., Kuebli & Fivush, 1994; Powell & Thomson, 1996; Powell et 
al., 1999) but in these studies, every instance of variation still includes a ‘slot’ in the script. For 
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example, Kuebli and Fivush (1994) had children make the same crafts on four occasions; the 
same nine steps were executed every time, but sometimes the specific item (e.g., the object used 
to create the bird’s beak) or the specific action (e.g., how the pipecleaner tail was fastened) was 
changed.  In contrast, the new details in the current research do not have ‘slots’ within the event 
script, but they are still plausible within the context of the event, such as getting warmed up only  
in occurrence three. These new details allow us to determine how children characterize 
completely unique event features within the context of a series of similar events. Children may 
recognize the new detail as a distinguishing feature of the occurrence, and as such they may be 
better able to separate memories for these occurrences from other similar occurrences, resulting 
in more informed source decisions at retrieval (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993).   
Further, this is the first study to examine children’s repeated-event memory using an 
optimal interview procedure where the child is given the freedom to report the occurrence they 
remember best, unlike previous research where children are oriented to a pre-determined 
occurrence, typically the last one (e.g., Connolly & Lindsay, 2001; Farrar & Goodman, 1992; 
Powell et al., 1999). This procedure avoids constraining a child to discuss the occurrence that the 
experimenters have chosen, and allows for clear and unabridged insight into what details were 
especially salient to the child.  Such a procedure is especially beneficial for the current 
experiment because we are exploring a detail-type that has not previously been considered in 
repeated-event research and thus do not want to place restrictions on what is reported.   
Children’s Memories of Repeated Experiences 
Memory for fixed items across multiple experiences (i.e., details that are exactly the same 
during each occurrence) is strong and accurate in children and adults, as compared to recall of a 
single experience (Connolly & Lindsay, 2001; Hudson, 1990). Even very young children (i.e., 4-
5 years) can be as accurate as older children (7-8 years; Powell et al., 1999). In contrast, when 
examining variable items (i.e., details that are repeated each time, such as always playing a 
counting game, but with different instantiations, such as counting frogs in Occurrence 1, 
counting cars in Occurrence 2, etc.), recall of a specific occurrence tends to be filled with 
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intrusions of instantiations from the other occurrences. These are referred to as ‘internal intrusion 
errors’, and are the most common type of errors found in children’s recall of repeated events 
(Powell et al., 1999; Powell & Thomson, 1996). For example, Powell and colleagues found that 
3-5 (Powell et al., 1999) and 4-5 year olds (Powell & Thomson, 1996) made a similar number of 
internal intrusions as older children (6- to 8-years old) when asked specific questions about 
items.  
In one of the earliest experiments on repeated-event memory, a distinctive memory 
pattern was found for a third type of item (Powell & Thomson, 1996). Specifically, hi/lo items 
had two different instantiations; one was presented twice as often as the other across the series 
(e.g., a highlighter pen was used in four occurrences [high frequency]; a pencil in the other two 
[low frequency]). All of the errors made by the children who participated in the repeated event 
were internal intrusion errors, primarily because children recalled the hi instantiations more 
readily than the lo instantiations, and so were less likely to attribute the lo instantiations to the 
correct occurrence.  Older children (6- to 8- year olds) made more of these errors in free recall 
than did younger children (4- to 5- year olds) because they reported far more lo instantiations. 
Thus, while the older children still confused details across occurrences, they were more likely to 
spontaneously report deviations than were the younger children.  
In summary, details that are presented in the same way each time are well-remembered 
and accessible (i.e., fixed items, and the hi frequency instantiation of hi/lo items). Details that 
have several alternatives across sessions are easily confused (variable items), and variations (i.e., 
the lo frequency instantiation of hi/lo items) are rarely reported when a higher frequency item is 
available.  
Children’s Memories for Distinctive Information 
Although low frequency details (variable and lo) are less accurately reported than fixed 
and hi details, these findings do not address the question of whether truly unique items (i.e., 
those that occur only once in any format across the entire series of events) are distinctive, and 
encoded as such. Objects or actions that occur in just one occurrence may be more memorable 
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than other detail-types that always occur in some format (even if the exact instantiations differ). 
Conversely, they may be less often reported, especially by younger children (4- to 5- year olds), 
because they are arbitrary to the event sequence; that is, since each new item only occurs one 
time across the four event occurrences, they cannot be logically related to other items within 
each event. Research has demonstrated that 3- and 5-year old children report less information 
from arbitrarily connected versus logically connected events, even with repeated experience 
(Fivush, Kuebli & Clubb, 1992).  
While new details have not been previously examined, three theoretical models motivated 
our predictions concerning children’s reporting of this detail-type: script theories (e.g., Farrar & 
Goodman, 1992; Hudson, Fivush & Kuebli, 1992; Hudson & Nelson, 1986), Fuzzy-Trace theory 
(e.g., Brainerd & Reyna, 1990) and the Source-Monitoring Framework (e.g., Johnson et al., 
1993). Script theories suggest that after a certain amount of experience with an event, people 
form a general representation of what details are usually present, and also are able to note 
deviations that are not typical of the event script. One such theory, the Schema Confirmation-
Deployment Model (Farrar & Goodman, 1992) suggests that this process requires more 
experiences for 4-year old  than 7-year old children and adults because younger children take 
longer to confirm which objects and actions are relevant for the script.  Thus, high frequency 
details (hi) can be confirmed quickly because they are always presented in the same way, while 
low frequency (variable and lo) details pose more of a challenge for preschool children because 
these details are absorbed into the general script representation, or are not encoded, during the 
confirmation phase.  Even though children as young as 30-months old have been able to 
generalize actions by a third experience (Bauer & Fivush, 1992), older children and adults 
progress through this ‘script confirmation’ phase more quickly and are thus able to enter into 
‘deployment’ sooner (i.e., notice event deviations, such as variable or lo, or completely new 
details, and modify the original script).  According to the ‘script pointer + tag hypothesis’, new 
details do not match existing patterns within the confirmed script and may be useful as ‘tags’ 
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(e.g., “the time she gave us leaf badges to wear”), which are tied directly to the memory trace 
and thus, easier to recall (Graesser, Gordon & Sawyer, 1979).    
Fuzzy-trace theory posits that for any experience, verbatim and gist traces are encoded 
simultaneously and in parallel. Verbatim traces refer to the exact surface details of an event (e.g., 
“I wore a leaf badge and the leader wore a blue cloak”), and include source information (e.g., 
“on the last day”). Gist traces refer to the overall meaning or structure of the experience (e.g., 
“we listen to stories and the leader wears a cloak”). Pre-schoolers take longer than school-aged 
children to form a gist representation and their verbatim traces decay more rapidly (Brainerd & 
Reyna, 1990, 1998, 2004). This combination of weakened verbatim traces and a weak gist to 
assist in event reconstruction make it especially difficult for young children to accurately 
describe a single occurrence of a repeated event. Event repetition strengthens the verbatim traces 
for details that are always or often the same (e.g., fixed, hi), and in contrast, strengthens the gist 
traces of items that have varying alternatives (e.g., “there was always a badge”) but not the 
alternatives of those items (e.g., “it was a jellybean badge”; Roberts & Powell, 2006).  Since new 
items have no alternatives, both verbatim and gist traces will be weak, so these details should be 
infrequently reported.  Older children’s verbatim traces decay more slowly than do younger 
children’s, however, so older children should have a better memory for new details. 
The Source-Monitoring Framework asserts that source is attributed at retrieval through a 
decision-making process about the qualitative properties of memories (e.g., “I remember the blue 
cloak the best, so it was probably on the last day”). Children are capable of remembering the 
content details of repeated events; for example, that a story was read each time, and the stories 
were about a boat, a birthday party, a mouse and a dog, but the problem lies in their ability to 
accurately tag the specific detail to the correct occurrence in a series of events (Powell & 
Thomson, 1996; Powell et al., 1999). These errors may also be referred to as ‘source-monitoring 
errors,’ or ‘source confusions’ which are akin to internal intrusions.   
The repeated-event nature of the current paradigm promotes developmental differences in 
source-monitoring ability because the occurrences are highly similar, and younger children (4- to 
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5- years old) are especially vulnerable to the effects of similarity (Johnson et al, 1993; Lindsay et 
al, 1991; Roberts & Blades, 1999). Details presented at higher frequencies (e.g., hi) will be more 
frequently recalled and, as they are present in more than one occurrence, source decisions are 
less necessary. Thus, age differences would not be expected for hi details.  In contrast, infrequent 
details such as lo and variable instantiations would require source decisions and so it is expected 
that 7- to 8- year old children will outperform 4- to 5- year old children at attributing these detail-
types to the correct occurrence.  Age differences can also be expected with respect to new 
instantiations. The source-monitoring framework posits that distinctive information may be 
encoded differently than mundane information. Specifically, more cognitive operations such as 
organization and elaboration should take place when distinctive information is encountered 
(Johnson et al., 1993). These elaborations promote the binding of event features, such as 
activities and objects, so that more informed source decisions can be made concerning which 
details were present in a given occurrence (see Shimamura, 1995 for a review). Thus, at least for 
older children, correct source attribution for this detail-type should be better than for variable 
and lo, because they are not a variation of a previously presented item, as are the other types. 
In summary, all three theories suggest that hi instantiations will be retrieved the most 
often, and will be the most accurately attributed of all detail types; these effects will not vary 
developmentally.  Similarly, all predict that variable instantiations will be reported, but confused 
across occurrences, that lo instantiations will be rarely reported, and that there will be age 
differences favouring older children in accurate source attribution of variable and lo 
instantiations. Regarding new details, script theory and the source-monitoring framework predict 
that these details will stand out and be bound with its occurrence whereas new details are likely 
to be simply forgotten according to fuzzy-trace theory. All three theories predict that younger 
children will be significantly less likely to report new details than older children.  
Method 
Design & Participants 
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The mixed design was a 2(age: 4-5- years vs. 7-8- years) x 4(item frequency type: hi, lo, 
variable, new) with the last factor within-subjects. Originally, 57 children were recruited to take 
part in the present study. Eighteen children were excluded; 6 missed either an event or interview 
session, 9 were lost due to parental constraints and/or cancellations, and data from 3 children 
were discarded because the interviewer did not ask open-ended questions in recall. These age 
groups were chosen to ease comparisons with previous literature and to show developmental 
differences across a period of significant growth in source-monitoring skills (Roberts, 2002). 
 The final sample consisted of 39 children (21 males, 18 females); 18 4- to 5-year-old 
children with a mean age of 62.15 months (SD = 6.62, range 49.87–71.50 months), and 21 7- to 
8-year-old children with a mean age of 95.58 months (SD = 7.04, range 84.67–107.40 months). 
The sample was predominantly middle-income and Caucasian. Children were recruited through a 
local daycare and through a database of local parents who had expressed interest in 
developmental research. Parents and teachers were instructed not to discuss the activities with 
the children, or to inform them that they would be interviewed about their memories. Children 
were assigned randomly to two counterbalanced item sets, under the constraint that age and 
gender be equated across the sets. Parents of children recruited through the database were 
compensated $10 for their time and travel expenses, and the children received a small toy after 
each session. The daycare received a donation of $5 for each child that participated. 
Materials 
 Materials were based on previous research on children’s memories for repeated events 
(Powell et al., 1999; Powell & Thomson, 1996; Powell & Thomson, 2003). As with the previous 
research, in order to control for item effects, two sets of counterbalanced items (Group 1 and 
Group 2) were created for the study. That is, variable items in Group 1 were reassigned to serve 
as hi/lo and new in Group 2, and so on. The two groups did not differ significantly in the amount 
of information reported, or on any accuracy measures, ts < 1, ps = ns, and are collapsed in all 
analyses.  
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Each occurrence consisted of 14 target items with different frequencies: variable (6 
items, e.g., the content of the story differed every time), hi/lo (6 items, e.g., children received 
hand sanitizer to get refreshed in three of the four occurrences and a fan in the remaining 
occurrence; each occurrence thus contained 1-2 lo instantiations). Each of the new details (8 in 
total) only appeared once throughout the series, and each occurrence included two distinct new 
objects or actions. For example, in Occurrence 1 of Group 2 (refer to Appendix A), children 
were introduced to ‘Pop the Fox’ (first new detail of the occurrence) and also a ‘noisy walrus’ 
(second new detail). Neither the fox nor the walrus were ever present in any of the other 
occurrences.  
Procedure 
The event. The event, always referred to in plural as the ‘[name of university] 
Activities,’ was carried out four times over a two week period by a trained research assistant 
(RA) with groups of one to five children. The events took roughly 20 min and were scheduled at 
approximately the same time of day with two occurrences per week.  Two RAs were responsible 
for conducting the events, and each ran approximately half of the children. The event included a 
number of different activities. In every occurrence, the leader would tell the children that they 
were participating in the ‘[name of university] Activities’, and put up a poster of the relevant 
upper-case letter for the university. After this beginning phase, the remaining activities took 
place. Activities that occurred every time include: the leader putting on a cloak, then reading a 
story using a bookmark and completing a puzzle with the children. Then the children got 
refreshed, made a picture with magnets, and played a counting game. For a full list of activities 
and objects in each occurrence, see Appendix A. Note that the list is organised by detail-type; the 
numbers represent the temporal order of the activities.  
The interview. Five to seven days after the last occurrence of the Activities, children 
individually participated in an interview, which lasted 20 to 30 min, and occurred in a different 
room than the Activities, with a different RA. The children were first asked to talk about 
themselves, in order to build rapport with the interviewer. The interviewer then explained she 
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was naive about the event (e.g., “I wasn’t there when you did the ‘[name of university] 
Activities’, but I’d really like to know what happened”). Once the child mentioned any 
information about the Activities (all did), they were immediately asked whether the activities 
happened one time or more than one time. Subsequently, the children were asked to talk about 
“the time they remembered best”, and the interviewers used open ended prompts such as “tell me 
more”, “what else happened,” and “what happened next/after that.”  Details freely recalled by 
children about this target occurrence were tallied and used in analyses.   
In past research interviewers have asked about a specific target occurrence, using 
temporal labels, such as ‘the last time’ (Farrar & Goodman, 1992), or contextual labels such as 
‘the time you wore the badge’ (Powell & Thomson, 2003). This procedure restricts the child to 
describing the occurrence that the interviewer has chosen, which may not be the one that the 
child is most capable of talking about. In the present study, then, labels for the occurrence being 
discussed were chosen by either the child or the interviewer. If the child used a clear and 
distinctive label that was unique to the occurrence (e.g., “I remember the last time” or “I 
remember the time with the yellow cloak”), then this label was used in the remainder of the 
questioning. If the child did not identify a clear label, the interviewers were instructed to use 
something the child said (which was unique to an occurrence) or temporal labels such as ‘the 
first time’.  
In order to help with labelling the occurrence, the interviewers in this study were not 
completely blind; they knew which instantiations were distinctive to every occurrence, and were 
aware which labels were appropriate in order to make the coding for accuracy possible. If the 
child did not come up with a discriminatory label on their own, the interviewers were instructed 
to use a distinctive instantiation mentioned by the child as the label. For instance, in Group 2, 
Occurrence 1 (refer to Appendix A), some distinctive instantiations were: the walrus (new), the 
yellow cloak (variable), or the fans for getting refreshed (lo) as they only happened  in the first 
occurrence.  
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When the child’s free narrative was exhausted, 20 specific questions were asked, one for 
each target item presented in Appendix A (e.g., what did you sit on the time [child’s label]; what 
was the story about the time [child’s label]). The questions pertained to the child-nominated 
occurrence, were asked in random order, and the child was not asked about an item if that item 
was used as their label. For instance, for a child who was asked to recall ‘the time you sat on 
garbage bags’, the question ‘What did you sit on?’ was omitted.   
Coding 
Interviews were audio-taped, videotaped and transcribed verbatim for coding purposes. 
Each of the items (e.g., “she read us a story”) as well as the instantiations of those items (e.g., 
boat story, or party story) that the child mentioned in Free Recall of their nominated occurrence 
was noted, along with the frequency type (hi, lo, variable, or new), as well as which 
occurrence(s) the instantiations occurred in (1, 2, 3, or 4). There were three categories for coding 
responses: (i) an instantiation was coded as an accurate attribution if it was present in the target 
occurrence; (ii) an instantiation was coded as an internal intrusion error if it had been present in 
one of the three non-target occurrences; (iii) any reference to an item/activity/object that was not 
present in any of the occurrences was coded as an external intrusion error (these were extremely 
rare, however, and are not considered further); (iv) Specific Questions only: in addition to the 
above categories, ‘don’t know’ and ‘other’ (e.g., when the child provided an answer that was 
semantically unrelated to the question) were created. Eight specific questions probed all eight 
new items presented across the series regardless of which session children elected to talk about. 
Thus, for six of those questions, the correct response would be that the instantiation did not occur 
in the particular session.  
Proportional accuracy scores were computed by dividing the total number of accurate 
attributions of each detail type (hi/lo, etc.) by the total number of instantiations of that type 
mentioned (recall) or asked about (specific questions). For example, a child who recalled four 
variable instantiations, three of which actually happened in the target occurrence, would have a 
proportion accuracy attribution score of .75 for variable instantiations in free recall. Proportional 
Recalling unique aspects 13  
 
scores for internal intrusions, external intrusions, don’t know, and other responses were similarly 
calculated.  
Results 
Recall Data 
We first examined which occurrences children nominated to describe. The two age 
groups differed in their pattern of choices. Younger children chose the last occurrence most often 
(n = 9, 50%), followed by the first (n = 6, 33%), second (n = 2, 11%) and third (n = 1, 6%). 
Older children, in contrast, were roughly equivalent in their choice to describe the first (n = 7, 
33%), third (n = 7, 33%) and last occurrences (n = 6, 29%), and only one elected to describe the 
second (n = 1, 5%).  
The recall portion of the interview could not be analyzed using a mixed-measures 
analysis of variance (ANOVA), as the children rarely spontaneously mentioned all of the item 
types in their recall. Table 1 presents the mean proportion of accurate attributions by detail-type 
for the younger and older groups. The table includes the number of children who mentioned each 
detail, as well as the results of one-sample t-tests assessing whether the children’s attributions 
were different from chance. In summary, few younger children mentioned new details (n = 3) or 
lo (n = 7) instantiations spontaneously, and none were accurately attributed. Ten younger 
children mentioned variable instantiations, but their source score was no different to chance 
(chance = 25% because variable instantiations were present in 1 of 4 occurrences). Source 
attribution of hi instantiations was better; 14 mentioned them, and were above chance (chance = 
75% because hi instantiations were present in three of four event sessions) in attributing them to 
the correct source. Approximately half (n = 11) of the older children mentioned new items and 
were accurate at attributing them correctly to their nominated occurrence almost three-quarters of 
the time. Children in the older age group generally mentioned more instantiations than the 
younger age group. Their accuracy at attributing instantiations to the correct occurrence was 
above chance only for new and hi instantiations.  
Specific Questions 
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Each type of response (accurate source attribution, internal intrusion, don’t know) was 
analysed using the proportional scores in 2(age: 4-5- years vs. 7-8- years) x 4 (item frequency 
type: hi vs. lo vs. variable vs. new) mixed ANOVAs. Alpha was set at .05. Six follow-up paired-
samples t-tests (i.e., all possible comparisons of item frequency types) were conducted to 
compare proportion accurate source attributions across item frequency. Alpha was corrected for 
multiple comparisons (.05/6 tests) and was set at .008.   
Accurate source attributions. As was predicted, the between-subjects effect of age was 
significant, F(1, 37) = 30.96, ηp2 =.47, p < .001; older children were more accurate (M = .50, SD 
= .12), than younger children (M = .29, SD = .12). There was a main effect of item frequency 
type, F(3, 35) = 61.82, ηp2 =.63, p < .001. Children were more likely to attribute the correct hi 
instantiation to its occurrence than new, variable and lo instantiations as was originally 
predicted. The analysis also revealed that new instantiations were accurately attributed to the 
target occurrence (or correctly rejected) more often than were lo instantiations. No other 
significant within-subjects effects were found at a corrected alpha level of .008. The interaction 
was not significant, F(3, 35) = .731, ηp2 < .02, p = ns. See Table 2 for means and t-tests. 
Internal intrusions. Because of the opportunity to provide ‘don’t know’ and ‘other’ 
responses to specific questions, proportion inaccurate is not the exact opposite of proportion 
accurate, and so internal intrusions (source confusions) were analysed. The test of sphericity was 
significant, and a Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied. The main effect of age on 
proportions of internal intrusion errors was not significant, F(1, 37) < 1, ηp2 < .01, p = ns. An 
effect of item frequency type was found, F(1.87, 35) = 28.30, ηp2 = .43, p < .001. Children made 
more internal intrusion errors in recall of lo and variable instantiations than new and hi 
instantiations. It was also found that children misattributed hi frequency instantiations less often 
to the target occurrence than new details. The interaction between age and item frequency type 
did not reach significance, F(1.87, 35) = .36, ηp2 < .01, p = ns. See Table 2 for means and t-tests. 
‘Don’t know’ responses. Although we did not make predictions regarding ‘don’t know’ 
responses, 87% of children made at least one ‘don’t know’ response to the 20 specific questions. 
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The effect of age was significant, F(1, 37) = 11.33, ηp2 = .23, p = .002. The younger children (M 
= .25, SD = .16) were significantly more likely to respond ‘don’t know’ than were older children 
(M = .08, SD = .16). The effect of item frequency type was also significant, F(3, 35) = 5.86, ηp2 = 
.14, p = .001. Children were significantly more likely to give a ‘don’t know’ response to 
questions about new and variable instantiations than hi instantiations. No other within-subjects 
effects were found. The interaction between age and item frequency type was not significant, 
F(3, 35) = .46, ηp2 < .02, p = ns. See Table 2 for means and t-tests. 
Discussion 
Past research has indicated that children often have difficulties isolating one episode of a 
repeated event (Connolly & Lindsay, 2001; Hudson, 1990; Powell et al., 1999; Powell & 
Thomson, 1996). Although there is a large amount of empirical data showing that repetition 
affects memory, we do not yet fully understand how children represent events that vary slightly 
each time, as is more typical of everyday events. We investigated whether details unique to an 
instance of a repeated event, and thus not part of the general script, would be more accurately 
attributed by children to their nominated target occurrence than other types of low-frequency 
details. This research is intended to be the first step in understanding whether children who can 
identify these unique features can be encouraged to use them to more precisely isolate individual 
instances of repeated events.    
 As expected, both younger and older children were most accurate at attributing hi 
instantiations to the correct occurrence, and there were no age differences. There were also no 
age differences in specific questioning in the proportion of internal intrusions for any item type, 
in keeping with findings suggesting that repeated experience minimizes age differences in 
intrusion errors when asked specific questions (Powell et al., 1999; Powell & Thomson, 1996). 
The data concerning hi instantiations replicate studies finding that oft-repeated items are recalled 
as accurately by younger children as older children (e.g., Powell et al., 1999). In contrast, 
children were much less accurate when discussing lo instantiations, and there were clear age 
differences in free recall. Descriptively, more 7- to 8-year-olds (81%) reported lo instantiations 
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than did 4- to 5-year olds (39%). Not one lo instantiation provided by a younger child was 
accurately attributed, while approximately half (48%) of the lo instantiations reported by the 
older children were. Variable instantiations were reported by children of both age groups as 
predicted, and they did not differ in their accuracy in free recall or in response to specific 
questions. Thus, children’s recall of self-nominated occurrences was comparable to their recall of 
an experiment-nominated occurrence for the item types that have been used in previous research.  
Turning now to the new details that were only presented once across the series, there was 
evidence that children were better able to attribute these details to the correct source than the 
other low frequency types (i.e., lo and variable). Specifically, there was a greater proportion of 
accurate attributions to questions about new details than lo items; accurate recall of new items 
was above chance for older children, and there were fewer internal intrusions about new than lo 
and variable items.  Several contemporary theories that can be applied to memories of repeated 
events (script, the source-monitoring framework, fuzzy trace) predict that unique (or new) details 
may be distinctive, depending upon the phase of script development, strength of verbatim traces, 
and/or ability to make source distinctions. These items may, therefore, enable children to retrieve 
details from a specific occurrence while minimally intruding details from other occurrences.   
In general, script theory is useful in predicting what children remember at the general 
script level, but fails to account for the different source errors children make when asked to 
speak about one specific occurrence. The schema-confirmation-deployment model (e.g., Farrar 
& Goodman, 1992) accounts for why instantiations are absorbed into the script or not, but does 
not describe whether or how those instantiations can be attributed to the correct occurrence.  As 
the new details were presented evenly across the four occurrences, and because one-third of the 
older children, who performed adequately on this detail-type, nominated the third occurrence to 
describe, primacy and recency effects do not easily explain our results. Rather, it seems that the 
new details ‘stood out’.  According to the schema confirmation-deployment model, new details 
would be considered atypical to the script and thus episodically encoded leading to enhanced 
memory for the item.   
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Both fuzzy-trace theory and the source-monitoring framework make useful predictions as 
to why children make source errors. The 4- to 5- year old children in this sample retrieved less 
information and were less accurate about which session it occurred in than the 7- to 8- year old 
children, giving support to fuzzy-trace theory’s assertion that younger children’s verbatim traces 
decay more quickly. Our findings suggest that the verbatim traces of the older children for the 
new items must have been stronger at retrieval than those of the younger children because half of 
the older children reported these details while only three younger children did so. The prediction 
that older children would more accurately attribute new items was supported by data from the 
free recall phase, as the older children were above chance at retrieving the correct new item, 
while the younger children were not.  
Thus, it is possible that the 7- to 8-year old children were making some effective source 
decisions at retrieval, but only with respect to the most distinctive details; the new details. Older 
children (6- years and older) are better at monitoring sources than are younger children (4- year 
olds) (Drummey & Newcombe, 2002; Roberts & Blades, 1999), and distinctive information 
should be more accurately attributed than more routine details (Johnson et al., 1993). As such, 
the source-monitoring framework predicted that there were would be fewer internal intrusions 
about new items than other items. This effect was demonstrated in free recall for the 7- to 8- year 
old children, suggesting that the new items made their corresponding source more distinctive 
and, therefore, made it easier to distinguish the different occurrences. It could be suggested that 
source information is encoded, as suggested by fuzzy-trace theory, but in the case where these 
verbatim traces have decayed, source attributions can still be made at the retrieval stage, as 
suggested by the source-monitoring framework. Thus, for children in this age range, distinctive 
details may serve as effective labels for interviewers to use in eliciting information about a 
specific occurrence, even when memory has decayed somewhat.  
Although specific predictions were not made, there were a significant number of ‘don’t 
know’ responses, accompanied by variability across age and item type. It was evident that 4- to 
5- year old children were significantly more likely to use this response, suggesting that they 
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failed to retrieve the verbatim detail altogether, due to its trace decay. Additionally, children 
were more likely to realize that they did not know the answer when asked about a new or 
variable instantiation, than when asked about a hi or lo instantiation. These findings complement 
those reported by Roberts and Powell (2005) who reported that 5- to 6-year old children were 
more confident in their answers about high frequency than low frequency instantiations. 
Together, these studies are intriguing in that they suggest some metacognitive functioning about 
variations in the difficulty of source decisions, despite the younger age.  
Conclusions  
One of the strengths of this research design is that we were able to ask the children about 
the time they remembered best. Due to the number of variations present in each occurrence we 
did not have to rely on the assumption that children would remember one specific deviation 
episode provided by the interviewer, as previous research has done (Farrar & Boyer-Pennington, 
1999; Farrar & Goodman, 1992; Powell et al., 1999; Powell & Thomson, 1996). This design also 
more closely resembled the reality of everyday life; that is, even events that are routine often 
include unpredictable variations as well as constants. Although the nature of events and their 
details are not often known to field interviewers, understanding the conditions in which 
children’s discrimination is heightened is useful for developing interview practices and 
procedures.  
The current research examined whether uniqueness helps children to distinguish between 
a series of similar events. While the children rarely mentioned new details spontaneously, free 
recall data demonstrate that when they are recalled by older children, their source accuracy is 
above chance.  In fact, they were accurate almost three-quarters of the time (73%).  Accordingly, 
we tentatively suggest that new details may be an avenue to assist older children with 
discriminating between instances of a repeated event because interviewers can be more confident 
that new items (compared to other item-types) have been accurately contextualized.  These item-
types may then serve as meaningful labels for separate instances, which were not constrained by 
the interviewer (e.g., ‘the time there was a walrus’ versus ‘the time bird sounds were heard’).  
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Anecdotal evidence from forensic transcripts of interviews about repeated-abuse allegations 
suggests that children 7-years and older do spontaneously mention occurrences of abuse in which 
something different from usual transpired (e.g., “I remember that time because I fell onto the 
floor”).  Future research incorporating a similar design could examine whether children who are 
directly asked to talk about ‘unique’ aspects of one occurrence are better at distinguishing 
between the similar occurrences than children who are simply asked to talk about the ‘time they 
remembered best’.  
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Footnotes 
1In some previous research (e.g., Powell & Thomson, 1997) variable items (i.e., those in 
which the instantiation changes each time, such as leader’s cloak; yellow, green, red, blue) have 
been referred to as “new” or “unique.” In the current study, new items refer to details that are 
only present in one occurrence in any form (e.g., a walrus joined the group in occurrence 1 only, 
and was never seen again).  
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Appendix A 
Example Target Items and Instantiations: Group 2 
 Item Frequency Occ 1 Occ 2 Occ 3 Occ 4 
4 Fox  New ‘Pop’ the fox 
joins activity  
   
5 Noisy animal New Walrus    
2 Children sit on New  Garbage 
Bag 
  
19 Put objects away in New  Lunchbox   
6 Warm-up activity New   Jump  
12 Music for relaxing New   Birds  
1 Children’s badge New    Leaves 
13 Part of body to relax  New    Stomach 
3 Leader’s cloak  Variable Yellow Green Red Blue 
7 Story content Variable Winter Party Dog in city Boat 
9 Bookmark  Variable Black triangles Orange 
circles 
Pink hearts Purple 
squares 
11 Clown Puzzle Variable Bike Juggling Tightrope Car 
16 Container to hold 
magnets  
Variable Purse Envelope Box Jar 
17 Counting objects  Variable Frogs Cars Flowers Tambourines 
8 Source of story Hi/Lo Library Leader 
wrote 
Library Library 
10 Utensil to write 
down name of story 
Hi/Lo Pencil Pencil Pencil Pen 
14 Refresh activity Hi/Lo Fans Hand 
sanitizer 
Hand 
sanitizer 
Hand 
sanitizer 
15 Magnet picture Hi/Lo Airport Airport Construction Airport 
18 Objects hidden 
under 
Hi/Lo Blanket Blanket Blanket T-shirt 
20 Leader’s next stop Hi/Lo Hospital Movie Hospital Hospital 
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Table 1 
Means by Age and Detail-Type of Accurate Attributions in Free recall with Chance t-tests  
 4- to 5- Year Olds 7- to 8-Year Olds 
Detail-Type 
(chance %) 
M SD n  
t-test 
M SD n t-test 
New (25%) .00 .00 3 NA .73 .47 11 t(10) = 3.39, p = .007 
Variable (25%) .23 .22 10 t(9) = .19, p = ns .40 .36 20 t(19) = 1.79, p = ns 
Hi (75%) .91 .27 14 t(13) = 2.22, p = .045 .92 .15 20  t(19) = 5.11, p < .001 
Lo (25%) .00 .00 7 NA .48 .45 17 t(16) = .96, p = ns 
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Table 2 
Mean Proportions of Accurate Attributions, Internal Intrusions and Don’t Know Responses to 
Specific Questions as a Function of Detail Type 
 Accurate Attribution  Internal Intrusion Don’t Know 
Significant 
difference
sa  
Hi > new, variable & lo 
New > lo 
Variable, lo & new > hi 
Variable > new 
New & variable > hi 
Hi 
.82 (.23)
 b
 
.06 (.10) 
.08 (.20)
 c
 
4-5 year 
olds 
.72 (.28) .07 (.11) .16 (.28) 
7-8 .91 (.11) .05 (.10) .01 (.04) 
New .34 (.23) .36 (.21) .24 (.22) 
4-5 .22 (.14) .40 (.24) .31 (.27) 
7-8 .44 (.25) .32 (.18) .17 (.14) 
Variable .27 (.21) .49 (.22) .19 (.20) 
4-5 .19 (.16) .47 (.21) .27 (.22) 
7-8 .33 (.23) .51 (.23) .11 (.13) 
Lo .18 (.31) .55 (.44) .12 (.30) 
4-5 .03 (.12) .58 (.46) .25 (.39) 
7-8 .31 (..37) .52 (.43) .02 (.11) 
a 
Significant t-tests evaluated at alpha < .008  
b 
Standard deviations in parentheses  
c
 Scores may be less than 1.00 because of coding for “other” responses. 
 
 
 
 
